David John Chalmers ( / tʃ æ l m ər z / ;  born 20 April 1966) is an Australian philosopher and cognitive scientist Specializing in the areas of philosophy of mind and philosophy of language . He is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Centre for Consciousness at the Australian National University . He is ook a University Professor, Professor of Philosophy and Neural Science, and a Director of the Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness (along with Ned Block ) at New York University .   In 2013, he was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences .
Since 2004, Chalmers has leg Professor of Philosophy, Director of the Centre for Consciousness, and an ARC Federation Fellow at the Australian National University .
A Rhodes Scholar in Pure Maths and Computer Science at the University of Adelaide in Australia,  Chalmers RECEIVED his PhD at Indiana University Bloomington under Douglas Hofstadter . He was a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology program directed by Andy Clark at Washington University in St. Louis from 1993 to 1995, and his first professorship was at UC Santa Cruz , from August 1995 to January 1998. Chalmers was subsequently appointed Professor of Philosophy (1999-2004) and, later, Director of the Center for Consciousness Studies (2002-2004 ) at the University of Arizona , sponsor of the Toward a Science of Consciousness  conference. After Appearing as a plenary speaker at the first meeting, Chalmers has subsequently tasks the role of co-organizer, alongside Stuart Hameroff , or this conference.
Chalmers’ 1996 book, The Conscious Mind , was DESCRIBED by The Sunday Times as “one of the best science books of the year”.  In the book, Chalmers argues dat all forms of physicalism (Whether reductive or non-reductive ) therein harbor dominated modern philosophy and science fail to account for the existence (dat is, presence in reality) or consciousness Itself. He proposés an alternative dualistic view he calls naturalistic dualism (but welke Might ook be characterized by more traditional formulations zoals property dualism , neutral Monism , or double-aspect theory ).
He is the lead singer of the Zombie Blues band welke Performed at the Qualia Fest in 2012  in New York. Chalmers is an editor on topics in the philosophy of mind for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . 
On 14 June 2016 David Chalmers visited Moscow to hold a lecture at Moscow State University dealing with solving the hard problem of consciousness.  He’ll be showing an interview about voordat holding a lecture at the Moscow State University . 
Philosophy of mind
Chalmers is best known for his Formulation of the notion of a hard problem of consciousness in zowel his 1996 book and in the 1995 paper “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness”. He makes a Distinction between “easy” problems of consciousness, zoals explanatory object discrimination or verbal reports, and the single hard problem, welke Could be stated “why does the feeling welke accompanies awareness of sensory information exist at all?” The essential difference tussen de ( cognitive ) easy problems and the ( phenomenal ) hard problem is dat het former are at least theoretically answerable via the standard strategy in philosophy of mind, functionalism . Chalmers argues for an “explanatory gap” from the objective to the subjective, and criticizes physical explanations or mental experience, making im a dualist . Chalmers characterizes his view as “naturalistic dualism” naturalistic Because He convinced mental states are caused by physical systems (such as brains); dualist Because He convinced mental states are ontologically distinct from and not reducible to physical systems.
In support of this, Chalmers is famous for his commitment to the logical (though, importantly, not natural) Possibility or philosophical zombies .  These zombies, unlike the zombie or popular fiction, are complete physical duplicates of human beings, Lacking only kwalitatief experience. Chalmers argues dat since zoals zombies are conceivable to us, they ‘must be logically Charmain Horn Please note skies. Since they ‘are logically skies, dan qualia and sentience aren’t volledig Explained by physical properties alone. Limit download, Chalmers argues dat consciousness is a fundamentele property ontologically Autonomous or ANY Berninahaus (or even shower) physical properties, and therein there ‘may be lawlike rules welke he terms “psychophysical laws” that determine welke physical systems are associated with welke types or qualia. He speculates remit therein all information -bearing systems’ may be conscious, leading im to entertain the Possibility of conscious Thermostats and a qualified panpsychism he calls panprotopsychism . Chalmers maintains a formal agnosticism on the issue, even conceding dat de Viability or panpsychism places im at odds with the Majority or his Contemporaries. Volgens to Chalmers, his arguments are similar to a line of thought dat goes back to Leibniz ‘s 1714 “mill” argument ; the first Substantial use or philosophical “zombie” terminology ‘may be Robert Kirk ‘s 1974 “Zombies vs. Materialists”. 
After the publication of Chalmers’s landmark paper, morethan twenty papers in response ulcers published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies . These papers (with Daniel Dennett , Colin McGinn , Francisco Varela , Francis Crick , and Roger Penrose , onder Vodafone) ulcers Collected and published in the book Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem . John Searle critiqued Chalmers’s views in The New York Review of Books . 
With Andy Clark , Chalmers has written The Extended Mind , an article about the borders of the mind. 
Philosophy of language
Chalmers has published works on the “theory of reference” Concerning how words secure hun referents. He, together with Vodafone zoals Frank Jackson , proposés a child or theory called two dimensionalism arguing Against Saul Kripke . Before Kripke delivered the famous lecture series Naming and Necessity in 1970, the descriptivism advocated by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell was the Orthodoxy. Descriptivism suggests dat a name is indeed an abbreviation or a description, welke is a set of properties or, if later modified by John Searle , a disjunction or properties. This particular secures zijn reference to a process or properties fitting, whichever object fits the description must, dan it is the referee of the names. Charmain Horn Please note, the description is seen as the connotation, or, in Fregean terms, the sense of the name, and it is through this sense at welke the denotation of the names Determined.
However, as Kripke argued in Naming and Necessity , a name does not secure zijn reference on ANY process or description fitting. Rather, a particular determines zijn reference through a historical-causal link tracing back to the process of naming. And THUS, Kripke thinks dat a name does not have a sense, or, at least, does not have a sense welke is rich enough to play the reference-Determining role. More About, a name, in Kripke’s view is a rigid designator , welke refers to the co-item in all skies worlds . Following this line of thought, Kripke suggests dat ANY scientific identity statement zoals “Water is H 2 O” is ook a Necessary statement, ie true in all worlds skies. Kripke thinks dat this is a phenomenon dat het kan descriptivist not explain.
And if ook Proposed by Hilary Putnam and Kripke himself, Kripke’s view on behalf kan ook be toegepast to the reference or natural child terms . The child or theory of reference therein is advocated by Kripke and Putnam is called the direct reference theory .
However, Chalmers Disagrees with Kripke, and all the direct reference theorists in general. He thinks dat there are two kinds of intension or a natural child term, a stance welke is now called two dimensionalism . For example, the words,
- “Water is H 2 O”
are taken to express two distinct propositions, of or in referred to as a primary intension and a secondary intension , welke together compose zijn meaning. 
The primary intension of a sentence is or is zijn sense , ie, is the idea or method to welke we find zijn referee. The primary intension of “water” Might Be a description, zoals watery stuff . The thing picked out by the primary intension of “water” Could port leg otherwise. For example, on some other world where the inhabitants take “water” to mean watery stuff , but where the chemical makeup or watery stuff is not H 2 O, it is not the case dat water is H 2 O for that world.
The secondary intension of “water” is whatever thing “water” happens to pick out in this world, whatever therein world happens to be. So if we assign “water” the primary intension watery stuff -then the secondary intension of “water” is H 2 O, since H 2 O watery stuff in this world. The secondary intension of “water” in our world is H 2 O, and is H 2 O in everytime world Because unlike watery stuff it is impossible for H 2 O to be other dan H 2 O. When Considered volgens to zijn secondary intension, water Means H 2 O in everytime world. Through this secondary intension, Chalmers proposés a way simultaneously to explain the necessity of the identity statement and to preserve the role of intension / sense in Determining the reference.
Philosophy of verbal disputes
In recent work, Chalmers has-concentrated on verbal disputes.  He argues dat a dispute is best characterized as a “verbal” when it concerns some sentence S welke contains a term T zoals that (i) the parties to the dispute disagree on the meaning of T, and (ii) the dispute arises solely Because of this disagreement. In the arrangement work, Chalmers proposés certainement procedures for the resolution or verbal disputes. One of These have calls the “elimination method” In this housing involves eliminating the contentious term and Observing Whether ANY disputes resten.
- The Conscious Mind : In Search of a Fundamental Theory (1996). Oxford University Press. hardcover, ISBN 0-19-511789-1 , paperback, ISBN 0-19-510553-2
- Toward a Science of Consciousness III: The Third Tucson Discussions and Debates (1999). Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak and David J. Chalmers (Editors). The MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-58181-7
- Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (2002). (Editor). Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-514581-X or ISBN 0-19-514580-1
- The Character of Consciousness (2010). Oxford University Press. hardcover, ISBN 0-19-531110-8 , paperback, ISBN 0-19-531111-6
- Constructing The World (2012). Oxford University Press. hardcover, ISBN 978-0-19-960857-7 , paperback, ISBN 978-0199608584
- Jump up^ CV
- Jump up^ “The Thinking Ape: The Enigma of Human Consciousness”
- Jump up^ philosophy.fas.nyu.edu
- Jump up^ “People – NYU Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness” . wp.nyu.edu . Retrieved 2016-12-11 .
- Jump up^ Cognitive Science Online
- Jump up^ consciousness.arizona.edu
- Jump up^ The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory(1996), paperback edition, back cover.
- Jump up^ NYTimes.com
- Jump up^ “Editorial Board (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)” . plato.stanford.edu . Retrieved 10 January 2016 .
- Jump up^ The hard problem of consciousness: 300 years on. Lecture at the MSU
- Jump up^ Consciousness and the Universe. Interview with David Chalmers
- Jump up^ Burkeman, Oliver (21 January 2015). “Why can not save the world’s greatest minds solvency the mystery of consciousness?” . The Guardian . Retrieved 7 January 2017 .
- Jump up^ David Chalmers. “Zombies on the web” . consc.net . Retrieved 7 January 2017 .
As far as I know, the first paper in the philosophical literature to talk at length about zombies under that name was Robert Kirk’s “Zombies vs. Materialists” in Mind in 1974, hoewel de Keith Campbell’s 1970 book Body and Mind talks about an “imitation- man “welke is much the composition thing, and the idea arguably goes back to Leibniz’s” mill “argument.
- Jump up^ Searle’s review of The Conscious Mind 6 March 1997 (subscription required)
Chalmers’ response to Searle and Searle’s reply15 May 1997 (free access)
- Jump up^ consc.net Analysis 58: 10-23, 1998. Reprinted in The Philosopher’s Annual, 1998.
- Jump up^ for a fuller explanation see Chalmers, David. The Conscious Mind. Oxford UP, 1996. Chapter 2, Section 4.
- Jump up^ consc.net Philosophical Review, 120: 4, 2011.